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RECAP; State of Montana v. James Morris Colburn: When the Sole 
Defense is Precluded by Montana’s Rape Shield Law 
 
Caitlin S. Williams  
No. DA 14-0181 Montana Supreme Court 
 
Oral Argument: Wednesday, December 2, 2015 at 9:30 AM in the 
Courtroom of the Montana Supreme Court, Joseph P. Mazurek Justice 




At oral argument, the main subject of debate was whether the 
defendant appellant, James Morris Colburn, was prevented from 
exercising his constitutional right to a defense by the trial court’s 
application of Montana’s rape shield statute. The defendant argued for 
the implementation of a procedure to balance the constitutional rights of 
the accused against the public policy implications underlying the rape 
shield statute when considering what evidence the accused can offer. 
Specifically, the defendant asserted that he was unable to raise a 
complete defense by not being able to introduce (1) evidence of a 
possible alternative source for the victim’s sexual knowledge, and (2) 
evidence of a possible motive for the victim to fabricate her allegations. 
The exclusion of that evidence and the underlying constitutional 
implications are the basis of this appeal. 
 II. MS. JENNIFER HURLEY FOR THE DEFENDANT 
 
Ms. Hurley commenced her argument by asserting the district 
court should have considered implementing a balancing test of the 
parties’ interests. Facing questions regarding whether she agreed that the 
rape shield is designed to protect victims, and that allowing evidence of 
sexualization to be introduced could re-traumatize the young victims the 
statute is designed to protect. Ms. Hurley agreed with that concern, but 
argued that by conducting a balancing test, the trial court can determine 
at its discretion the extent the details are necessary to avoid 
retraumatization.  
The Court then challenged Ms. Hurley on the matter of timing: 
whether or not the evidence of sexualization has to be first presented by 
the State before the defendant can present it. After acknowledging that 
this specific issue has not been litigated in Montana, Ms. Hurley 
identified that while the State relied heavily on R.W.’s sexual knowledge 
and the subsequent inference she could only have that knowledge if she 
was abused by the defendant, the defendant was not allowed to rebut that 
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inference by introducing evidence of a possible alternative source of that 
knowledge. The argument then shifted to whether the State “opened the 
door” with that argument, and whether it was fair to argue that in doing 
so waived the application of the rape shield. 
In examining the proposed balancing test, the Court questioned 
Hurley on the distinction between the victim’s credibility versus her 
reputation and character. Specifically, evidence of credibility is 
potentially admissible, while evidence of the victim’s reputation and 
character is barred under the rape shield. Ms. Hurley responded that 
while the State argues that the defendant did not offer sufficient evidence 
that the alleged abuse R.W. sustained by her father was relevant, the 
defense was actually not able to make an offer of proof in that respect. 
The defense sought to offer a forensic interview report where R.W. 
disclosed the abuse by her father and drew several depictions of the 
abuse. Ms. Hurley argued that the district court should have assessed to 
what extent the details of the father’s abuse were necessary, and at the 
very least that the defendant should have been able to rebut the inference 
that R.W. could only have the sexual knowledge she did if she had been 
abused by the defendant. 
Ms. Hurley concluded her opening argument by proposing the 
procedure utilized in State ex rel. Mazurek v. District Court,1 where a 
balancing test was implemented when the defendant sought to introduce 
the victim’s alleged prior false accusations of sexual abuse.2 Ms. Hurley 
advocated for a similar balancing test to be applied on remand in the 
instant case, where the defendant could give notice of his intent to 
introduce evidence of prior sexual abuse and explain its relevance to a 
material issue in this case. She further stated that there should then be a 
hearing outside of the presence of a jury where the Court could conduct 
the balancing test and “determine the extent and form of the evidence.” 
 
III. MR. MARK FOWLER FOR THE STATE OF MONTANA 
 
The State commenced its argument with the assertion that the 
defendant failed to offer sufficient proof as to the relevancy of the abuse 
R.W. sustained by her father. Furthermore, the State attacked the 
admissibility of the forensic interview the defense sought to introduce, 
claiming that it is double hearsay and the defendant had multiple 
opportunities to have a hearing on that evidence but declined to do so. 
The Court quickly pointed out that there is a statement in that forensic 
report (referencing R.W.’s disclosure about the abuse by her father) that 
is “devastating” to the State as it concerns exactly what the defense is 
arguing––an alternative source of sexual knowledge. Mr. Fowler 
                                           
1 State ex. rel. Mazurek v. District Court, 922 P.2d 474 (Mont. 1996). 
2 Id. at 480. 
2015            RECAP; MONTANA V. COLBURN               223 
  
 
countered that the Court is not permitted under the Constitution to admit 
irrelevant evidence, regardless of whether or not the State opened the 
door. Focusing on that specific point, the Court asked if Mr. Fowler 
really considered evidence of an alternative source of sexual knowledge 
as irrelevant in a child rape case. Mr. Fowler argued that it was not 
relevant because the defense never demonstrated the nexus between the 
incidents of sexual abuse R.W. sustained from her father and from the 
defendant, to which the Court pointed out the defendant was precluded 
from raising that defense. 
Mr. Fowler next argued the forensic interview report was not 
even introduced to the trial judge until after the jury verdict was 
delivered, despite ample opportunities to introduce it earlier. He posited 
that the defense likely waited to introduce the report for strategic 
reasons: the defense recognized that the incidents of sexual abuse are two 
totally separate acts and likely feared the relevancy challenge. The Court 
was again skeptical of that theory, and pushed Mr. Fowler on his stance 
that the jury should not have been able to hear about a possible 
alternative source of R.W.’s sexual knowledge. Mr. Fowler conceded 
that the evidence was only marginally relevant, because R.W. was able to 
distinguish between the two incidents of sexual assault.  
The Court then considered the reasoning behind excluding the 
details the attacks have in common and allowing the jury to subsequently 
conclude that R.W. possessed sexual knowledge only from the attack by 
the defendant. Mr. Fowler responded by stressing the important public 
policy implications underlying the rape shield, including the risk of 
confusing or misleading the jury and violating the victim’s privacy. The 
Court then pointed out that there were many details specific to the 
alleged attack by the defendant that were not shared by the alleged attack 
by the father, and the State could have introduced that evidence without 
“opening the door” to the source of R.W.’s sexual knowledge. 
The Court further questioned the State’s position on Ms. 
Hurley’s proposed use of the balancing test under Mazurek.  Mr. Fowler 
argued that the instant case is distinguishable from Mazurek in that there 
was no proffered evidence that R.W. fabricated her allegations, while 
there was evidence of fabrication in Mazurek. The Court then countered 
that the fabrication was not the point, but rather the admissibility of such 
evidence, to which the State argued that it was incumbent on defense 
counsel to proffer that evidence. 
The State concluded its argument by pointing out that the 
prosecutor instructed the jury to make its determination of the 
defendant’s guilt based on R.W.’s in-court testimony, and therefore any 
error the trial court may have made in excluding evidence was harmless. 
 
IV. HURLEY REBUTTAL BY MS. HURLEY 
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Before Ms. Hurley began to rebut the State’s arguments, she was 
asked by the Court for a statement of the rule regarding the exception to 
the rape shield that she proposes under the Constitution. Ms. Hurley 
responded by stating that while there is no plain rule statement that can 
be applied, even if the State doesn’t make the inference explicit (namely, 
the inference that R.W. could only possess this sexual knowledge if she 
had been abused by the defendant), it would still naturally be inferred by 
a jury, which is sufficient on its own to violate the defendant’s 
constitutional rights. Therefore, the Court should implement a balancing 
test to allow the defendant to rebut that inference. 
Regarding the State’s argument that the defense did not make a 
sufficient offer of proof regarding the relevance of the abuse R.W. 
sustained by her father, Ms. Hurley strongly denied that assertion and 
stated the District Court had a copy of the forensic interview where that 
information was disclosed, it was a proposed exhibit, and it was cited to 
in the defendant’s motion in limine. The final question from the Court 
was whether the defense objected to the testimony of Nurse Hanson on 
direct examination, to which Ms. Hurley said that the testimony was not 
objectionable under the rules of evidence, and yet the defendant did not 




The fact that the Justices asked much more critical questions of 
the State than of the defendant suggests that this will not be an open-and-
shut case. The defendant faced an uphill battle going into oral argument 
considering the unpleasant nature of the accusations against him and the 
potential consequences of loosening the standards surrounding the rape 
shield. However, the Court appeared far more skeptical of the State’s 
apparent willingness to completely dismiss the defendant’s constitutional 
right to raise a defense. There is a very real possibility that the appellant 
could be successful in having this case remanded with instruction that 
allows him to introduce certain evidence, but regardless of which way 
the Court rules, this case will have far-reaching implications on the 
future litigation of child rape cases. 
 
